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Abstract
Successes of law enforcement in apprehending offenders are often publicized
events. Such events have been found to result in temporary reductions in of-
fending, or “residual deterrence”. We provide a theory of residual deterrence
which accounts for the incentives of both enforcement officials and potential of-
fenders. We do so by introducing to a standard inspection framework costs that
must be incurred to commence enforcement. Such costs in practice include hiring
specialized staff, undertaking targeted research and coordinating personnel. We
illustrate how our model can be used to address a number of policy questions
regarding the optimal design of enforcement authorities.
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1 Introduction
An important rationale for the enforcement of laws and regulations concerns the deter-
rence of undesirable behavior. The illegality of actions, by itself, may not be enough
to dissuade offenders. Instead, the perceived threat of apprehension and punishment
seems to play an important role (see Nagin, 2013, for a review of the evidence).
One factor that is salient in determining the perceived risk of punishment is past
enforcement decisions, such as the extent of past convictions, fines or arrests. Evidence
can be found in a range of settings, including: reductions in mark-ups of bread man-
ufacturers in response to Department of Justice price fixing prosecutions (Block, Nold
and Sidak, 1981); reductions in water pollution violations by paper mills in response
to Environmental Protection Agency fines against other nearby mills (Shimshack and
Ward, 2005); reductions in the extent of “aggressive” financial reporting in industries
subject to recent Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement actions (Jennings,
Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011, Schenk, 2012, and Brown et al., 2014); and reductions
in drink driving and other personal offending following police crackdowns on specific
crimes (Sherman, 1990, Taylor, Koper and Woods, 2013, and Banerjee et al., 2014).
These observations fit a pattern which Sherman terms “residual deterrence”. Resid-
ual deterrence occurs when reductions in offending follow a phase of active or intensive
enforcement, and persist even after this enforcement phase has ended.
In the above examples, the possibility of residual deterrence seems to depend, at
first instance, on the perceptions of potential offenders about the likelihood of detec-
tion. It is then important to understand: How are potential offenders’ perceptions
determined? What affects the extent and duration of residual deterrence (if any)?
This paper aims at an equilibrium explanation of residual deterrence based on both
the motives of enforcement officials (for concreteness, the “regulator” in our model)
and potential offenders (the “firms”). In particular, we provide a model in which con-
victions sustained by the regulator against offending firms are followed by prolonged
periods of low offending, which we equate with residual deterrence.
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Our theory posits a self-interested regulator which gains by apprehending offending
firms but finds inspections costly. Since firms are deterred only if the regulator is likely
to be inspecting, the theory must explain why the regulator continues to monitor firms
even when they are unlikely to offend. Our explanation hinges on the additional
costs a regulator faces when commencing new inspections. We show how such costs
can manifest in the episodes of residual deterrence that follow the apprehension of an
offending firm.
There are often a myriad of costs a regulator faces when beginning to monitor a
particular industry or to enforce a particular regulation; in our model, when inspecting
following at least one period of inactivity. For instance, when the Federal Trade
Commission chose to crack down on modern privacy offenses by large corporations
in the late 2000s, it bore the start-up costs of a new forensics laboratory, employing
new experts and purchasing new equipment.1 More generally, a regulatory authority
investigating new offenses or industries must engage in specialized research (even if by
existing personnel) to come up to date with industry dynamics and relevant case law
(Kovacic and Hyman, 2016, describe such research as a form of regulatory “R&D” that
is essential for successful enforcement). Even in instances where the authority possesses
the relevant knowledge and expertise, coordinating new enforcement activities requires
time and planning that is often costly.2
We study a dynamic version of a simple workhorse model – the inspection game. In
this game, a long-lived regulator faces a sequence of short-lived firms. Committing an
offense is only worthwhile for a firm if the regulator is not inspecting, while inspecting
is only worthwhile for the regulator if an offense is committed. In our baseline model
(in Section 3), the only public information is the history of previous “convictions”; that
is, the periods where the regulator was inspecting and the firm committed an offense.
This corresponds to a view that the most salient action an enforcement authority can
1See Schectman (2014, January 22).
2Related, there may be costs stemming from the uncertainty of undertaking a new activity. Or,
there may be “psychological costs” of changing the current pattern of activity (see, e.g., Klemperer,
1995).
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take is to investigate and penalize offending. It is through convictions that firms learn
that the regulator has been active (say, investigating a particular instance of price
fixing or cracking down on financial mis-statements by one of its peers).
In the repeated version of the inspection game described above, equilibrium follows
a repetition of static play; i.e., past convictions do not affect the rate of offending.
Things are different once we introduce the additional cost of commencing inspections.
We show that equilibrium then features reputational effects: a conviction is followed
by several periods during which firms believe the probability of inspection is relatively
high and they are therefore less likely to offend. We identify this pattern as residual
deterrence. Over time, in the absence of a conviction, firms gradually update their
beliefs and the perceived likelihood of inspection falls, eventually reaching its lowest
(the original, or “baseline”) level. Offending likewise rises to the baseline level. This
pattern corresponds to what Sherman (1990) has termed “deterrence decay”.
The equilibrium pattern we uncover might be described in terms of “reputation
cycles”. Each cycle is characterized by a conviction, a subsequent reduction in of-
fending, and finally a resumption of offending at the baseline level. We show that the
additional costs of commencing inspections are necessary to generate these cycles, since
the episodes of residual deterrence disappear as the initiation costs shrink. The role
of these costs is that the regulator remains willing to inspect while firms are deterred
simply to avoid reincurring the same costs when offending resumes at the baseline level.
Indeed, continuing to vigilantly monitor for offenses is a natural way to maintain the
initial investment in information or personnel that facilitates inspections.3
Our model can be used to shed light on a number of policy questions, such as
determinants of the length of residual deterrence and the overall offense rate. We
are also able to address the important question of optimal information disclosure:
should a designer of the regulatory authority require its activities to be disclosed?
Analysis of such questions is enabled by the simplicity of our approach, and the fact
3Since a positive level of offending persists even during periods of residual deterrence, the chance
to obtain additional convictions is always a further motivation for continuing inspections.
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that the equilibrium process for offenses and convictions is uniquely determined. The
only source of multiple equilibria is that the regulator may condition its switching on
privately-held and payoff-irrelevant past information.
It is worth noting up front that we focus on a regulator concerned with obtaining
convictions, as opposed, for instance, to deterrence itself. This specification seems to
make sense in many settings, since the allocation of enforcement resources often rests
on the discretion of personnel influenced by organizational incentives. Kovacic and
Hyman (2016) argue that competition authorities face strong incentives to prosecute
and take new cases; for instance, they note that the Global Competition Review’s (2015)
evaluation of “top antitrust authorities” focuses on successful prosecutions. Similarly,
Benson, Kim and Rasmussen (1994, p 163) argue that police “incentives to watch
or patrol in order to prevent crimes are relatively weak, and incentives to wait until
crimes are committed in order to respond and make arrests are relatively strong”.
While financial rewards for law enforcers to catch offending are often controversial or
illegal, even quite explicit incentives can arise. Perhaps the best-known example in
recent times was the Ferguson Police Department’s focus on generating revenue by
writing tickets.4
While we believe that a direct concern for obtaining convictions is often the most
relevant objective, we are able to extend our model to settings where the regulator
gains from reducing offending. Again, we exhibit equilibria featuring reputation cy-
cles. We find that the regulator in this case may be incentivized to inspect precisely
because it anticipates residual deterrence following a conviction. That is, the promise
of residual deterrence can play the same role as the direct reward for convictions in
our baseline model that is based on the classical inspection game. In this sense, the
economics of residual deterrence in the two cases is closely related. However, there are
also important differences. For instance, when the regulator’s payoff does not depend
4See the United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division (2015). Note that the model
we introduce below can explicitly account for this revenue-raising motive for inspections, for instance
by setting the regulator’s reward for a conviction equal to the firm’s penalty.
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directly on convictions (and hence the only possible motivation for inspecting relates
to the possibility of deterring future offenses), there exist also equilibria with no deter-
rence. In particular, there exist equilibria in which the regulator never inspects since
any (off-path) conviction fails to yield a deterrent effect.
The rest of the paper is as follows. We next briefly review literature on the
economic theory of deterrence, as well as on reputations. Section 2 introduces the en-
vironment. Section 3 solves for equilibrium and discusses comparative statics. Section
4 provides further discussion, contrasting our theory with alternative explanations of
residual deterrence. Section 5 examines the role of information disclosure, and Section
6 considers a regulator motivated by a desire to deter offending. Section 7 concludes.
1.1 Literature review
At least since Becker (1968), economists have been interested in the deterrence role
of policing and enforcement. Applications include not only criminal or delinquent
behavior, but also the regulated behavior of firms such as environmental emissions,
health and safety standards and anticompetitive practices. This work typically simpli-
fies the analysis by adopting a static framework with full commitment to the policing
strategy. The focus has then often been on deriving the optimal policies to which
governments, regulators, police or contracting parties should commit (see, among oth-
ers, Becker, 1968, Townsend, 1979, Polinsky and Shavell, 1984, Reinganum and Wilde,
1985, Mookherjee and Png, 1989 and 1994, Lazear, 2006, Bond and Hagerty, 2010, and
Eeckhout, Persico and Todd, 2010).
In practice, however, there are limits to the ability of policy makers to credibly
commit to the desired rate of policing. First, policing itself is typically delegated
to agencies or individuals whose motives are not necessarily aligned with the policy
maker’s. Second, announcements concerning the degree of enforcement or policing
may not be credible (see Reinganum and Wilde, 1986, Khalil, 1997, and Strausz, 1997,
for settings where the principal cannot commit to an enforcement rule, reflecting the
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concerns raised here). Potential offenders are thus more likely to form judgments about
the level of enforcement activity from past observations. The reputational effects
of policing, however, have been given little theoretical attention in the enforcement
literature.
Our paper is related to the literature on seller reputations with endogenously
switching types; see for instance Mailath and Samuelson (2001), Iossa and Rey (2014),
Dilme´ (2014) and Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013, 2014). Our model exhibits several
differences to this literature that necessitate a separate analysis; many of these differ-
ences result because we instead consider a stage game that builds on the well-known
(static) inspection game. In contrast, the stage game in the papers on seller reputation
amounts to a product-choice game. Unlike the inspection game, these product-choice
games have a dominant strategy: optimal myopic behavior involves the seller under-
investing in quality. To exemplify the difference this can make, note that the literature
on seller reputations typically features a multiplicity of equilibria due to “self-fulfilling
prophecies”; that is, the seller may face no incentive to invest in quality in equilibrium
precisely because buyers believe that such investment never occurs. In contrast, our
model favors unique equilibrium predictions (at least about relevant economic outcomes
such as the probability of offending).
A further key novelty of our setting relative to the various papers on seller repu-
tation is that the public information depends on the actions of all players, both the
regulator and firms (this requires us to account carefully for the evolution of information
about the regulator’s actions; for instance, learning is gradual when the probability of
offending is low). This feature is in common with Halac and Prat (2016), who analyze
the deterioration of manager-worker relationships.5 They find an equilibrium with
similar features to ours in the so-called “bad news” case, where the worker increases
his effort immediately after being found shirking, since he believes that a monitoring
technology is likely to be in place. However, there are several important differences to
our paper. First, as we discuss further in Section 3.2, our regulator has the ability
5This work arose independently and (as far as we know) simultaneously to our own.
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to cease inspecting, whereas the monitoring technology breaks exogenously (and ran-
domly) in Halac and Prat’s model. This permits us to tackle directly the question
of why the regulator may continue inspecting although firms are temporarily deterred
from offending. We also find that the regulator actively chooses to stop inspecting in
equilibrium, to avoid the costs of inspection, and this is the source of “deterrence de-
cay” in our model. In Halac and Prat’s equilibrium, a related pattern of decay results
instead from exogenous failure of the inspection technology. Second, we make a range
of different modeling choices, motivated by applications of regulation and enforcement:
we study a regulator directly motivated by convictions (rather than reputation) and
firms with heterogeneous preferences for offending. Apart from requiring a novel anal-
ysis, these choices have implications for our key equilibrium predictions. Third, we
study questions of interest for policy, such as the determinants of residual deterrence
and the optimal choice of information disclosure policy.
Finally, our model is related to models of dynamic games with switching costs and
public actions, such as Lipman and Wang (2000, 2009) and Caruana and Einav (2008).
Relative to these papers, we focus on a setting with incomplete information regarding
the long-run player’s actions. While the earlier works emphasize the possibility that
small switching costs result in high persistence of equilibrium actions, persistence in our
model is determined by the combination of switching costs and incomplete information.
2 Environment
We study a long-lived regulator interacting at discrete dates t = 0, 1, 2, . . . with an
infinite number of firms, one per period. While each firm survives only a single
period, the regulator is forward-looking with discount factor δ = e−r∆, where r > 0 is
the discount rate and ∆ > 0 is the length of a period. When varying δ in what follows,
this will be interpreted as a change in the period length ∆; equivalently, as a change
in the frequency of inspections of different firms.
Actions. At the beginning of any period t, the firm independently (and privately)
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draws a value pit from a continuous distribution F with full support on a finite interval
[pi, p¯i], 0 < pi < p¯i. Then, the firm chooses an action at ∈ {O,N} where O denotes
“offend” and N denotes “do not offend”. Simultaneously, the regulator chooses an
action bt ∈ {I,W}, where I denotes “inspect” and W denotes “wait”.
Somewhat abusively, we let I = O = 1 and W = N = 0. Thus atbt = 1 if the firm
offends while the regulator inspects at date t, while atbt = 0 otherwise. If atbt = 1, we
say that the regulator “obtains a conviction” at date t.6
Payoffs. Period-t payoffs are determined according to a standard inspection game.
If the firm offends without a conviction (at = O and bt = W ), then it earns a payoff
pit. If it offends and is convicted (at = O and bt = I), then it sustains a penalty γ > 0,
which is net of any benefits from the offense. Otherwise, its payoff is zero.
If the regulator inspects at date t, it suffers a cost (1 − δ)i > 0, where the factor
(1− δ) represents normalization based on the “length” of a period. It incurs no cost
if waiting.7 In the event of obtaining a conviction, the regulator earns an additional
lump-sum payoff of y > (1− δ)i. Later, we consider the possibility that the regulator
cares about deterring firms rather than obtaining convictions.
In addition to the costs and benefits specified above, the regulator sustains a
cost S > 0 if commencing inspection at period t.8 Let 1 (bt−1, bt) take value one
if (bt−1, bt) = (W, I) and equal zero otherwise. Period t payoffs are then summarized
in the following table.
To ensure that inspections occur in equilibrium, we assume that inspection and
6We will assume that a firm can only be convicted in the period it takes its action at. One way
to interpret this is that evidence of an offense lasts only one period. This seems unambiguously the
right assumption where punishment requires the offender to be “caught in the act”. More generally,
it seems a reasonable simplification, one which has often been adopted, for instance, by the literature
on leniency programs for cartels (see, e.g., Spagnolo (2005) and Aubert, Rey and Kovacic (2006)).
One way to relax the assumption would be to assume that while firms take only one action, they can
still be convicted for a limited time subsequently. We expect residual deterrence would continue to
arise in equilibrium in this model.
7In general, “waiting” corresponds to a broad range of alternative actions the regulator could
devote time to in a given period. For simplicity, we do not explicitly model these alternatives in the
present paper.
8Using a similar argument as in Dilme´ (2014) it is easy to see that the assumption that there is no
cost of stopping inspection is without loss of generality, as otherwise it can be renormalized to zero.
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firm
at = N at = O
regulator
bt = W 0, 0 0, pit
bt = I −(1− δ)i− S 1 (bt−1, bt) , 0 y − (1− δ)i− S 1 (bt−1, bt) ,−γ
Table 1: Stage-game payoffs in the period-t stage game.
commencement costs are not too large in the following sense.
Assumption 1 The stage game is always an inspection game; i.e., y−(1−δ)i−S > 0.9
A brief analysis of the stage game allows us to anticipate the role of commencement
costs in determining equilibrium offending, as we explain in the following remark.
Remark 1 (Static analysis) By Assumption 1, the stage game is a standard static
inspection game in which the regulator faces a cost (1− δ) i from inspecting if it in-
spected in the previous period, or a cost (1− δ) i+S otherwise. As is well understood,
these costs determine the equilibrium offense probability in the one-shot game (where
we ignore the effect of the regulator’s actions on its future payoffs). In particular, if
it is common knowledge that the regulator played “wait” in the previous period, then
the equilibrium probability of offending is (1−δ)i+S
y
. Conversely, if the regulator is com-
monly known to have inspected, then the equilibrium offense probability is (1−δ)i
y
. These
offense probabilities ensure the regulator is indifferent between its two actions, wait and
inspect.
The same predictions continue to hold if instead the firm is commonly known to
believe that the regulator previously played, respectively, “wait” or “inspect” with suffi-
ciently high probability in the previous period. This indicates that it is the firm’s beliefs
regarding the regulator’s costs which determine the probability of offending. When we
study repeated play, these beliefs will be determined by the convictions that occur in
equilibrium (for instance, a conviction will be taken as evidence that the regulator in-
spected in a given period).
9If instead y − (1− δ)i− S < 0, then there will be no equilibrium in which the regulator inspects
on the path of play.
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While the static analysis is suggestive, it fails to shed light on at least two aspects of
equilibrium play. First, past information regarding inspections emerges endogenously
through past convictions that ought to be explicitly modeled. Second, and crucially, the
regulator’s decision to inspect at a given date lowers the total inspection costs at future
dates. Whether to inspect is therefore a dynamic decision that must account for the
future evolution of offense probabilities.
We now complete the dynamic specification of the model, defining the available
information, player strategies and equilibrium. Because changes in the regulator’s
actions affect payoffs, it is necessary to specify the regulator’s action in the period
before the game begins. For concreteness we let b−1 = W (our results do not hinge on
this assumption).
Information. In each period t, a public signal may be generated providing infor-
mation on the players’ actions. If a signal is generated, we write ht = 1; otherwise,
ht = 0. Motivated by the idea that the activity of an enforcement agency becomes
known chiefly through enforcement actions themselves, we focus on the case where
a signal is generated on the date of a conviction. That is, for each date t, we let
ht = atbt ∈ {0, 1}. Players perfectly recall the signals so that, at the beginning of
period t, the date−t firm observes the “public history” ht ≡ (h0, ..., ht−1) ∈ {0, 1}t.
We find it convenient to let 0τ = (0, 0, . . . , 0) denote the sequence of τ zeros. Thus,
for j > 1, (ht, 0j) = (h0, ..., ht−1, 0, . . . , 0) is the history in which ht is followed by j
periods without a conviction.
The regulator observes both the public history and its private actions. Thus a
private history for the regulator at date t is h˜t ≡ (ht, bt), where bt = (b0, ..., bt−1) ∈
{I,W}t is the sequence of regulator actions up to date t.
Strategies, equilibrium and continuation payoffs. We anticipate that firms
will choose cut-off strategies in equilibrium, with the date-t firm offending if and only
if pit ≥ pi (ht), where pi (ht) is the threshold at public history ht. The cut-off pi (ht) then
implies a probability of offending α(ht) ∈ [0, 1] at history ht, and we find it useful to
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describe each firm’s strategy in terms of this probability. We use αt to denote α (h
t)
when there is no risk of confusion. A (behavioral) strategy for the regulator assigns to
each private history h˜t ∈ {0, 1}t × {I,W}t the probability that the regulator inspects
at h˜t, β(h˜t). We study perfect Bayesian equilibria of the above game.
For a fixed strategy β of the regulator, we find the following abuse of notation
convenient. For each public history ht, let β(ht) ≡ E[β(h˜t)∣∣ht] be the equilibrium
probability that the regulator inspects at time t as determined according to the strategy
β, where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution over private histories
h˜t with public component ht. We use βt to denote β(h
t) when there is no risk of
confusion. Probabilities β(ht) (which we term the firms’ “perceived probability of
inspection”) are particularly useful since (i) a date-t firm’s payoff is affected by h˜t only
through β(ht), (ii) these probabilities will be determined uniquely across equilibria of
our baseline model, and (iii) in many instances, we might expect an external observer
to have data only on the publicly observable signals (that is, convictions). In contrast,
equilibrium strategies for the regulator, as a function of private histories, will not be
uniquely determined.
It is now useful to define the continuation payoff of the regulator at any date t and
for any strategies of the firm and regulator. For a private history h˜t = (ht, bt) of the
regulator, this is
Vt
(
β, α; h˜t
)
= Eβ,α
[ ∞∑
s=t
δs−t (ybsas − (1− δ)ibs − S 1 (bs−1, bs)) |h˜t
]
.
Under an optimal strategy for the regulator and for a fixed public history, the regu-
lator’s payoffs must be independent of all but the last realization of b ∈ {I,W}. We
thus denote equilibrium payoffs for the regulator following public history ht and date
t− 1 regulatory action bt−1, by Vbt−1(ht).
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3 Equilibrium characterization
At a given period t, if the probability that the regulator inspects (conditional on the
public history) is βt, a firm only offends if
pit
pit+γ
≥ βt. This implies that the probability
of offending is given by
αt = Pr
(
pit
pit+γ
≥ βt
)
= Pr
(
pit ≥ βt1−βtγ
)
= 1− F( βt
1−βtγ
) ≡ α(βt) , (1)
where our definition of α(·) involves an obvious abuse of notation. Let β ≡ pi
pi+γ
and
β¯ ≡ p¯i
p¯i+γ
(thus, α(β) = 1 and α(β¯) = 0). Our first result is that the equilibrium
inspection probability at any history ht lies above β and below β¯, so that firms never
offend with probability one (α(βt) is never one) and deterrence is never perfect (α(βt)
is never zero).
Lemma 1 For all equilibria, for all ht, β(ht) ∈ (β, β¯).
To help understand this result, note that the proof in the Appendix argues the
following. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that β(ht) ≥ β¯ for some history ht,
so either firms are completely deterred in every future period, or full deterrence lasts
finitely many periods. In the first case, the regulator strictly gains by switching to
“wait” from period t onwards (thus saving on inspection costs). In the second, there
is some history hs, with s ≥ t, such that β(hs) ≥ β¯ but β(hs, 0) < β(hs). At history
hs, the firm does not offend. Also, since the regulator switches in equilibrium to wait
with some probability at history (hs, 0), we must have
VI(h
s) = −(1− δ)i+ δVW (hs, 0).
Nevertheless, if the regulator switches to wait at time s and history hs, it obtains
δVW (h
s, 0). By ceasing inspection early, the regulator saves (1 − δ)i, so this is a
profitable deviation. This is a contradiction, so necessarily β(ht) < β¯. We can
conclude that the regulator never has strict incentives to switch to inspect, which
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implies VW (h
t) = 0 at any public history ht. So now, again for the sake of contradiction,
assume β(ht) ≤ β for some history ht. Then, the firm offends with probability one,
so if the regulator waited in the previous period and switches to inspect at time t it
obtains at least y − S − (1 − δ)i. This is positive by Assumption 1, so the regulator
strictly prefers to inspect, a contradiction.
The above implies that the regulator never has a strict incentive to switch from
wait to inspect (otherwise, we would have βt = 1 at some t), nor a strict incentive to
switch from inspect to wait (otherwise, we would have βt = 0). Hence, for all histories
ht, VI(h
t)−VW (ht) lies between zero and S. It takes value zero in periods in which the
regulator switches to wait, and takes value S in periods in which the regulator switches
to inspect.
Next, notice that some switching must then occur in equilibrium. Following a
conviction, firms must believe that the regulator inspected in the previous period with
probability one. Hence, the regulator must switch from inspect to wait immediately
following a conviction. Suppose that a conviction occurs at history ht (i.e., suppose
ht = 1). Then, at any time s, from date t+1 onwards, if the regulator is known not to
change its action, and absent any conviction, the probability of inspection conditional
on the public history evolves according to Bayes’ rule. In particular,
β(ht, 0s−t)
1− β(ht, 0s) =
β(ht, 0s−t−1)
1− β(ht, 0s−t−1)
(
1− α(β(ht, 0s−t−1))) . (2)
This implies that the probability of inspection, as perceived by firms, gradually declines
over time. Hence, Lemma 1 implies there must eventually come a time when the
regulator switches from wait to inspect. This pattern turns out to define equilibrium
play, which we summarize next.
Equilibrium can be understood as consisting of two main phases: a “stationary
phase” in which the probability of offending remains at a baseline level, and a “resid-
ual deterrence phase” which follows a conviction and during which the probability of
offending is reduced relative to the baseline in the stationary phase.
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Proposition 1 An equilibrium exists. Furthermore, there exist unique values βmin, βmax ∈
(β, β¯) with βmin < βmax, and T ∈ N, such that the following holds in any equilibrium:
Step 1. (Stationary phase) If the regulator inspects in the previous period, then it keeps
inspecting, and if, instead, the regulator waits in the previous period, then it
switches to inspect so that the perceived probability of inspection remains equal to
βmin. If there is a conviction, the play moves to Step 2; and otherwise, it stays
in Step 1.
Step 2. (Residual deterrence, following a conviction) In the period following a conviction,
the regulator switches with probability 1 − βmax to wait. As long as there is no
conviction, in the subsequent T − 1 periods, the regulator does not switch, so the
perceived probability of inspection decreases over time. If there is no conviction,
play moves to Step 1; and otherwise, it reinitializes at Step 2.
While Proposition 1 characterizes the two main phases of equilibrium, there is also
an initial phase. This is the first period, in which the regulator switches from “wait” to
“inspect” with probability βmin. Play then continues in the stationary phase if there is
no conviction, and proceeds to the residual deterrence phase after the first conviction.
It is worth noting that the values βmin and βmax, and hence both the probability
of offending after each public history and the stochastic process for convictions, are
uniquely determined in equilibrium. In fact, the only reason for multiple equilibria is
that the regulator’s decision to inspect may depend on payoff-irrelevant components of
its private history; i.e., the decisions to inspect prior to the previous period.
The equilibrium pattern fits well the examples described in the Introduction. Dur-
ing the stationary phase, equilibrium offending is at its highest level, with the probabil-
ity of offending equal to α
(
βmin
) ≡ α∗. “Residual deterrence” then follows a conviction;
i.e., there are several periods of low offending. Firms’ beliefs about whether the reg-
ulator is inspecting gradually deteriorate in the absence of a further conviction, and
this corresponds to what Sherman (1990) terms “deterrence decay”. These patterns
of offending are illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Example of dynamics of αt. In the graph, the deterrence length is T = 6,
and there are convictions in periods 3, 14 and 18. Each stationary phase ends with a
conviction, while deterrence phases either end after 6 periods or are re-initialized by a
conviction.
The regulator’s incentives to switch actions are illustrated in Figure 2. First, recall
that the regulator’s expected continuation payoff, having played wait in the previous
period, is VW (h
t) = 0 at any public history ht. The incentive for the regulator
to change its action can then be understood by studying VI(h
t), the continuation
payoff from being in the “inspect” state at the beginning of period t. During the
stationary phase, the regulator is willing to commence inspecting, if not already, and
this requires VI(h
t) = S. Conversely, immediately following a conviction, i.e. if
ht−1 = 1, we must have VI(ht) = 0 so the regulator is willing to cease inspections. The
deterrence phase can be understood as several periods of low offending such that the
regulator’s payoff from inspecting passes from zero immediately following a conviction
to S at the beginning of the next stationary phase (assuming that phase is reached
without a further conviction).10 In particular, these periods of low offending reduce
the regulator’s payoff from continuing to inspect immediately following a conviction.
It will often be helpful for understanding to consider settings with δ close to one,
10The stationary phase begins when the posterior probability of inspection in the previous period,
conditional on no conviction in that period, falls below βmin, at which point the regulator (if not
inspecting) commences inspection with positive probability.
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S
Figure 2: Example of dynamics of VI as a function of time. In the graph, there is a
conviction in periods 3, 14 and 18.
which corresponds to the case where the regulator inspects firms at a high frequency.11
For such cases, the probability that any individual firm offends, or that the regulator
changes its action in a given period, is (at least from an ex-ante perspective) close to
zero. Nonetheless, on fixed time intervals, the probability of an offense or conviction
occurring, or of the regulator changing its action, remains bounded away from both
zero and one as δ approaches one (i.e., as the period length ∆ approaches zero).
3.1 Some comparative statics
With our central result in hand, let us consider some determinants of equilibrium
offending. First, recall that α∗ ≡ α (βmin) is the baseline offense probability, i.e., the
probability of offending during the stationary phase. This offending is such that, during
the stationary phase, the regulator is indifferent between commencing inspections and
not; that is,
S︸︷︷︸
Cost of commencing inspection
= −i (1− δ) + α∗y + (1− α∗) δS︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net benefit of commencing inspection
. (3)
11It is perhaps worth noting that, in some applications, the frequency of firm monitoring (as captured
by ∆) might be related to the appropriate inspection technology, and hence to the commencement
cost S.
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This equation balances the cost of commencing inspection, S, against the benefit from
doing so net of the inspection cost i (1− δ). The benefit of inspecting includes the ex-
pected payoff from a conviction in the first period of inspection α∗y, and the discounted
continuation payoff in case inspection yields no conviction, which equals (1− α∗) δS.
The latter follows because, if ht is a history at which the regulator is in the stationary
phase, then VI(h
t, 0) = S, since in the absence of a conviction the regulator remains in
the stationary phase and hence willing to commence inspecting at (ht, 0) if it did not
do so at ht.
Equation (3) yields the following result:
Corollary 1 The probability of offending in the stationary phase satisfies
α∗ =
(1− δ) (i+ S)
y − δS (4)
and hence is increasing in S.
The comparative statics in Corollary 1 can be easily understood from (3). While
increasing S increases both the cost of commencing inspection and the continuation
payoff absent a conviction, the former effect dominates the regulator’s payoff, so α∗
must rise to keep the regulator indifferent to commencing inspection.12
While increasing the initiation cost S increases the stationary-phase offense proba-
bility α∗, it also increases the length of residual deterrence, as explained in the following
result.
Corollary 2 The length of the residual-deterrence phase T is increasing in the cost of
initiating inspections S.
The reason for this result is simple. As the cost of initiating inspections grows
so does the regulator’s continuation payoff VI(h
t) at any history ht in the stationary
12It is worth noting in this context that, as S approaches zero, α∗ approaches the probability of
offending in the static inspection game discussed in Remark 1. In fact, one can show that, as S → 0,
inspection and offense probabilities converge to those in the static game (with S = 0) after all public
histories.
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phase; indeed, we have VI(h
t) = S. Hence, the number of periods of low offending
needed to ensure the regulator’s continuation payoff immediately after a conviction
equals zero grows with the initiation cost S.
Since an increase in the initiation cost S both increases the length of residual
deterrence and the probability of offending in the stationary phase, the overall impact
on offending in the long run is not immediately clear. One way to proceed is to define
the “long-run average offense probability” α¯ by finding the ex-ante expected average
probability of offending over each of the first τ periods, and then taking the limit as
τ →∞; i.e.,
α¯ = lim
τ→∞
1
τ
E
[
τ−1∑
s=0
α (hs)
]
. (5)
We then show the following.
Corollary 3 Consider a change in the initiation cost from S ′ to S ′′ < S ′. If δ is large
enough, then the long-run average offense probability, α¯, is lower at S ′′ than at S ′.
The reason for taking the discount factor δ large in Corollary 3 is tractability; we
have been unable to otherwise rule out that the reduction in initiation costs increases
long-run offending. We thus prefer to view the corollary as exemplifying a possible,
but perhaps not necessary, implication of the model, one which could be interpreted in
different ways in light of applications. On the one hand, the result suggests that there
are settings where a policy maker who is concerned with long-run average offending
would gain by lowering the cost of commencing new inspections (in particular, inducing
any change from S ′ to S ′′ in case δ is sufficiently large). Such a reduction in start-up
costs for the regulator might be achieved by defining broad and flexible organizational
goals (allowing the regulator the flexibility to go after new offenses), by ensuring the
flexibility to hire new personnel, or by making long-term investments in organizational
capabilities (such as maintaining a research team which can turn quickly to new topics
or offenses). Alternatively, to the extent that the regulator’s initiation costs are difficult
to evaluate directly, we have established that those enforcement authorities inducing
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longer episodes of residual deterrence may, in some settings, in fact be less nimble
(having higher initiation costs S) and hence have higher long-run average offense rates
(such regulators might then be viewed as less effective).
4 Alternative explanations for residual deterrence
We now discuss the two broad alternative explanations for residual deterrence that can
be discerned from the literature; cognitive biases of offenders, and offender learning
about an exogenous inspection technology.
Recency bias. One possible view is that residual deterrence results from indi-
viduals assigning too much weight to recently observed regulatory activities, such as
convictions against rival firms. This idea is advanced, for instance, by Chen (2016)
in his study of executions of deserters from the British military in World War I (see
also Hertwig et al., 2004, and Kahneman, 2011, for a discussion of these biases in more
general contexts). This explanation requires deviations in probability assessments by
offenders from the true probability of being apprehended and potentially explains both
residual deterrence and deterrence decay. For instance, Chen finds that executions of
deserters do appear to modestly reduce desertions by English soldiers, although this
response does not appear to have a rational motivation (there is no evidence that a
deserter is more likely to be executed following a recent desertion; if anything, the
relationship is the opposite). Similarly, Kastlunger et al. (2009) find that individuals
who are audited earlier in a laboratory audit game exhibit higher compliance than
those audited later on; the authors suggest possible psychological explanations.
The key difference between theories of recency bias and our proposed explanation
for residual deterrence is that ours is based on the rational behavior of offenders. In
other words, the probability of monitoring in the periods following a conviction, given
the public information available to firms, is in fact higher in the equilibrium of our
model. This is not without empirical implications, even for a researcher whose only
data consists of the public information about convictions. In particular, note that the
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probability of a conviction at date t when the probability of inspection is βt is given
by
βt α(βt) = βt
(
1− F
(
βt
1−βtγ
))
which may increase or decrease with βt. Depending on the value of γ and the func-
tion F , subsequent convictions thus become either more or less likely in the periods
immediately following a conviction. A formal theory of recency bias might instead
posit a constant true inspection probability, while a conviction leads firms only to per-
ceive a higher probability. In turn, firms are deterred and so convictions necessarily
become less likely immediately after a conviction.13 Hence, a researcher can poten-
tially distinguish the two theories by examining the (temporal) correlation structure
of convictions.
To give an empirical example, consider the Georgetown area “crackdown” by po-
lice on minor offenses such as parking violations and street crimes, as documented by
Sherman (1990). The crackdown resulted in much higher levels of arrests and fines
over a six month period, together with a modest reduction in crime (for instance, a
reduction in reported robberies and self-reports of offending). The increase in arrests
are inconsistent with deterrence being driven purely by cognitive or psychological bi-
ases. This is true even though interviews with residents suggest they did believe the
likelihood of being caught for various offenses had risen, and that this belief persisted
at least one month after the police crackdown had ended. Our model explains such an
evolution of beliefs by positing fully-rational agents and start-up costs for crackdowns
or inspections, rather than cognitive biases. In our view, the (ex-post) incorrect belief
that the crackdown remained in force is a simple consequence of imperfect information.
Exogenously determined inspections. A number of other papers suggest,
either formally or informally, that either (i) the inspection technology remains fixed
over time and cannot be adjusted, or (ii) the inspection technology can change or
13Another possibility with the same implication is that the enforcer reacts strategically to the
potential offender’s bias, and hence reduces inspections during a period of deterrence.
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“break”, but it does so exogenously. In the first class of explanations, Block, Nold
and Sidak (1981) write (Footnote 23) that residual deterrence can be explained by
“assuming that colluders use Bayesian methods to estimate the prob-
ability that they will be apprehended in a particular period. In this for-
mulation, whenever colluders are apprehended, colluders estimate of their
probability of apprehension increases, and that increase is dramatic if their
a priori distribution is diffuse and has small mean.”
Banerjee et al. (2014) also propose a dynamic model in which offenders learn about the
policing policy through their actions, but where such a policy is taken as given. While
these models can render “residual deterrence” (in Banerjee et al., it may be that drivers
are deterred from a specific location, although not from drink driving altogether)14,
they do not provide an explicit theory for “deterrence decay”. In particular, if the
monitoring technology does not change, then potential offenders may potentially learn
if it is in place (and where), and hence avoid being caught at all future dates. This
is clearly different from our theory, where offending and convictions re-emerge after
enough time.
A second possible class of explanations is to remedy the absence of deterrence decay
in the first by positing that the inspection technology changes with time. For instance,
one could generate patterns of residual deterrence and deterrence decay by letting the
probability of inspection follow some exogenous (say Markov) stochastic process. After
enough time, potential offenders would be willing to experiment to “test” the state of
the technology; convictions would manifest in a heightened belief that monitoring is
intense, and hence phases of residual deterrence. One difficulty with this view is that
it leaves unexplained why monitoring changes and how fast. Naturally, the answer to
the latter determines the answer to important questions, such as those regarding the
duration of the residual deterrence.
14Note that firms relocating their offending to another unmonitored location is also a possible
interpretation of “deterrence” in our model. Under this view, deterrence at a given location may not
provide deterrence overall, so the social welfare implications of monitoring may be moot.
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Relatedly, Halac and Prat (2016) suppose that the inspector (the “manager” in
their model) can invest in the monitoring technology, but that it breaks exogenously.
While the length of deterrence in their “bad news” model is endogenously determined,
it also depends on the rate at which the monitoring technology exogenously decays.
For instance, if decay occurs ever more slowly, then the length of the “deterrence
phase” grows without bound. In our model, the regulator instead has full control over
whether it inspects or not in each period, and the length of deterrence depends on the
costs of inspecting and commencing inspections (as well as the distribution over firm
preferences F ).
5 Disclosure of inspections
An important question in enforcement relates to the optimality of disclosing the author-
ity’s activities. Several papers, notably Lando and Shavell (2004), Lazear (2006) and
Eeckhout, Persico and Todd (2010), have explored the optimal disclosure of “groups”
to be targeted by the enforcement authority. Whether such disclosure is optimal in
these papers depends on the distribution of preferences for offending. In our setting, it
is similarly natural to examine the role of disclosure of information regarding the regu-
lator’s actions (for instance, whether to disclose such information may be an important
decision in the design of regulatory institutions).
In general, analyzing information disclosure is challenging in our framework because
of the apparent need to characterize equilibria of our game for all possible information
disclosure policies. While our working paper version, Dilme´ and Garrett (2015), shows
how to characterize equilibria for richer information structures, we have not attempted
an exhaustive treatment. Here, we will simply contrast the case where the regulator’s
activities are fully disclosed to the case where only convictions are disclosed.
Suppose then that the regulator’s inspection choices are publicly disclosed. In
this case, a public history ht is an element of ({I,W} × {0, 1})t, and describes both
inspection choices and convictions. Given a public history ht, let bt−1(ht) ∈ {I,W}
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denote the inspection decision made at date t− 1. We find the following.
Proposition 2 There is a unique equilibrium of the game in which the regulator’s
inspections are publicly disclosed. In such an equilibrium,
α(ht) = αbt−1(ht) ≡

(1−δ)i
y
if bt−1(ht) = I,
(1−δ)i+S
y
if bt−1(ht) = W .
The proof of Proposition 2 shows that the regulator is indifferent at any date t
between continuing its action from date t− 1 and changing this action. As such, the
regulator’s continuation payoff at any date must be equal to zero (indeed, the regulator
is willing to play “wait” indefinitely). For this reason, the regulator’s incentives at
any date are the same as in the one-shot game discussed in Remark 1. Balancing the
regulator’s incentives to wait or inspect in each period then pins down the equilibrium
probability of offending.
We can now compute the long-run average offense probability in the current setting
with full disclosure. This is given by an average of αI and αW , each of them weighted
by the likelihood of the corresponding actions of the regulator:15
α¯fd =
α−1(αW )
1− α−1(αI) + α−1(αW )αI +
1− α−1(αI)
1− α−1(αI) + α−1(αW )αW .
We can compare the full-disclosure long-run offense rate α¯fd with the long-run offense
probability of our base model. While it appears difficult to draw general conclusions,
we can provide a result when interactions are sufficiently frequent (i.e., if δ is close
enough to one) as follows.
Proposition 3 There exists δ¯ < 1 such that if δ > δ¯ then α¯fd > α¯.
15Here, α
−1(αW )
1−α−1(αI)+α−1(αW ) is the unique stationary probability of the regulator inspecting, while
1−α−1(αI)
1−α−1(αI)+α−1(αW ) is the unique stationary probability of the regulator waiting, given that inspections
follow a first-order Markov process with transitions determined by α−1 (·).
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The intuition for the result is that, when decisions to inspect are public, the prob-
ability of offending following the regulator’s decision to “wait” must be high enough
to incentivize the regulator to pay the initiation cost S, notwithstanding that the con-
tinuation payoff following “inspect” is zero. Conversely, when only convictions are
observable, the offense probability in the stationary phase, α∗, is smaller. This is be-
cause, when the regulator switches to inspect, the regulator either obtains a conviction
or enjoys a positive continuation payoff. This positive continuation payoff derives from
the fact the regulator’s inspection is not detected absent a conviction (so the regulator
continues to inspect until the next conviction without affecting equilibrium offending).
When δ is close to one, i.e. when interactions between the regulator and firms are
sufficiently frequent, the difference between the two cases is particularly stark. In this
case, when only convictions are public, the probability of offending in any period is
small (indeed, recall that α∗ → 0 as δ → 1); in contrast, when inspections are public,
the probability of offending following a decision by the regulator to “wait” is close to
S/y (and approaches this value as δ approaches one).
Finally, note that Proposition 3 remains silent on cases where δ is not sufficiently
large. For such values, the long-run offense probability can either increase or decrease
with disclosure of inspections.16 Naturally, the comparison can be made on a case by
case basis, using the results in Propositions 1 and 2.
6 Deterrence-motivated regulator
So far we studied a regulator motivated directly by its concern for apprehending of-
fenses. As noted in the Introduction, such an assumption seems reasonable in settings
where regulatory officials are motivated by implicit rewards or career concerns. More
generally, however, the regulator may have preferences for deterring offenses. To ex-
amine this possibility, we consider a more general payoff structure as follows.
16Examples where the long-run offense probability is higher under non-disclosure of inspections can
be obtained, in particular, when values of S and δ are small.
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firm
at = N at = O
regulator
bt = W 0, 0 −L, pit
bt = I −(1−δ)i−S 1 (bt−1, bt) , 0 y−L−(1−δ)i−S 1 (bt−1, bt) ,−γ
Table 2: Stage-game payoffs in the period-t stage game for the deterrence-motivated
regulator.
Here L is the regulator’s loss as a result of an offense, while y ≥ 0 is its reward
for apprehending an offense (when L = 0, the model is identical to that in Section
3). Continue to assume that the costs i and S, as well as the penalty γ, are strictly
positive, and let firms’ benefits of offending pit be distributed according to the c.d.f. F
as described above. The following result describes a sufficient condition under which
an equilibrium as in Proposition 1 exists.
Proposition 4 Fix L > 0. In the model with a deterrence-motivated regulator, there
is an equilibrium with residual deterrence which permits the same characterization as
in Proposition 1 if either (i) Assumption 1 holds, or (ii) δ is sufficiently close to one.
Proposition 4 establishes that “residual deterrence” equilibria (i.e., equilibria with
residual deterrence admitting the same characterization as Proposition 1) can be found
also when the regulator cares about deterring offenses. A sufficient condition is that δ
is sufficiently close to one, which guarantees the regulator stands to gain enough from
future deterrence to justify inspections.
For residual deterrence equilibria to exist requires the extent (i.e., duration and
magnitude) of residual deterrence to be such that the regulator, following a conviction,
is indifferent between continuing to inspect and instead switching its action to “wait”.
In addition, the probability of offending during the stationary phase must be such
that the regulator is willing to commence inspections during these periods. Ensuring
both occur jointly is then a fixed-point problem which, as for the baseline model, is
complicated by the fact that the probability of offending during the residual deterrence
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phase is determined by Bayesian updating (which, as before, determines deterrence
decay).
While Proposition 4 gives sufficient conditions for existence of residual deterrence
equilibria, uniqueness of behavior is a more challenging question. In addition to
the multiplicity of equilibria due to the regulator conditioning inspections on payoff-
irrelevant private information (as was observed for our baseline model), we have been
unable, in general, to rule out residual deterrence equilibria that manifest in different
offending and processes for convictions (equivalently, different values for βmin and βmax
which determine equilibrium play as described in the characterization of Proposition
1). This can be addressed, however, on a case by case basis, implementing numerically
the constructive approach to existence in the proof of Proposition 4; i.e., solving the
aforementioned fixed-point problem numerically (in a range of examples, we computed
that residual deterrence equilibria are unique up to the aforementioned conditioning of
the regulator’s strategy on payoff-irrelevant information).
To understand better the economics of residual deterrence equilibria, it is worth
considering settings where the regulator is motivated by deterrence alone; that is, a
regulator whose payoff is lowered by L > 0 whenever there is an offense, but for which
y = 0. In this case, the unique equilibrium of the stage game without switching costs
is (W,O); that is, the presence of the regulator does not deter offending. Still, with
repeated interactions and positive costs of initiating inspections, if L is positive and δ
is large enough, there exist residual deterrence equilibria where the regulator inspects
only to obtain residual deterrence following a conviction. Conversely, it is important
to note that there exist also other equilibria; in particular, there exists a “crime wave”
equilibrium in which the firms always offend with probability one, and the regulator
never inspects (and where, following any conviction, the regulator switches to “wait”
with probability one). This suggests the existence of still further equilibria (that do not
admit the characterization in Proposition 1), for instance those involving equilibrium
“punishments” for the regulator in the form of a crime wave. We make no attempt to
characterize the multiplicity of equilibria.
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7 Conclusions
We have studied a dynamic version of the inspection game in which an inspector (a
regulator, police, or other enforcement official) incurs a resource cost to commencing
inspections. We showed that this cost gives rise to “reputational” effects: following a
conviction, offending is reduced for several periods before resuming at a steady level.
This effect is present whether the inspector is motivated by obtaining convictions (as
in our baseline model of Section 3) or “socially motivated” in the sense that it values
deterrence itself (as in Section 6).
Our model sheds light on how frictions from reallocation of resources shape the
incentives of both firms and the regulator in a market. Its tractability and unique-
ness of its predictions allows for interesting comparative statics results. While the
length of the deterrence phase increases when reallocating resources is more costly, the
subsequent offense rate is also higher. We showed that, when monitoring of poten-
tial offenders is frequent, disclosing the regulator’s previous activities tends to increase
offending, since a higher rate of offending is needed for the regulator to be willing to
commence inspections.
Admittedly, the framework described in this paper addresses a much simplified
setting relative to many applications seen in practice. A key simplification was our
modeling of the authority’s decision as a binary choice — whether or not to inspect.
In many settings, an authority might be expected to rotate its inspections around
different possible targets, incurring costs to commence inspection at a new target (say
a particular location, or a particular set of offenses). The authority then effectively
faces an endogenous outside option in deciding whether to focus on any given target;
the value of this option is the payoff obtained by focusing inspections on the next best
target. At the same time, potential offenders face choices concerning not only whether
to offend, but potentially where to offend or what kind of offense to commit. Such
decisions depend, in turn, on perceptions of where the authority’s attention is focused
at the relevant moment. While we aimed in this paper at exhibiting residual deterrence
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in the simplest possible setting, these additional issues call for a richer model. We
expect this will be the subject of future work.
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Appendix A: Proofs of the Main Results
Proof of Lemma 1. Fix, for the rest of the proof, an equilibrium. We show
first that β (ht) < β¯ at all ht. Assume for a contradiction that there is a public
history ht with β(ht) ≥ β¯, so α(ht) = 0. Let τ > 0 be the smallest value such that
β(ht, 0τ ) < β(ht); that is, the smallest value such that the regulator switches to wait
with a positive probability at history (ht, 0τ ). Note that, necessarily, there exists such
a finite value for τ ; otherwise, the continuation value at history ht of inspecting forever
would be
∑∞
τ=0−(1−δ)δτ i = −i, so the regulator would strictly prefer to switch to wait
at time t and ensure a continuation payoff of 0, which would imply β(ht) = 0. Note
also that, switching to wait at history (ht, 0τ−1) (instead of at history (ht, 0τ )) gives
the regulator a continuation value of 0 + δVW (h
t, 0τ ), while the payoff of inspecting
one more period and switching at (ht, 0τ ) is −(1− δ)i+ δVW (ht, 0τ ) < δVW (ht, 0τ ). So,
the regulator has a strict incentive to switch to wait at time τ − 1, which leads to a
contradiction.
We now prove that VW (h
t) = 0 for all ht. It is worth clarifying that, here and in
the proofs that follow, we take Vb(h
t) to be defined for all ht ∈ {0, 1}t and b ∈ {W, I}
as the regulator’s optimal payoff following public history ht when, at the beginning of
the period t, the regulator’s action is b. That is, it is the continuation value of the
regulator’s problem when date-t payoffs are determined in Table 1 given bt−1 = b, and
taking the firms’ equilibrium strategies as given.17
Since VW (h
t) ≥ 0 for all ht (since waiting forever gives a continuation payoff equal
to 0) assume, for the sake of contradiction, that V¯W > 0, where V¯W is the supremum of
17Thus, if b = W but the regulator chooses to inspect at date t under a payoff-maximizing strategy,
it incurs the start-up cost S (but not otherwise). This simply extends the definition in the main text
to ensure that Vb(h
t) is well-defined, for instance when b = W and ht−1 = 1 (although recall that the
signal ht−1 = 1 does not occur when the regulator’s date t− 1 action is W ).
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VW (h
t) over all public histories ht ∈ {0, 1}t. Consider a history ht where VW (ht) > δV¯W .
At this history, if the regulator waited in period t−1, it has a strict incentive to switch
to inspect, since waiting implies a payoff of no higher than δV¯W and, by assumption,
VW (h
t) > δV¯W , so VW (h
t) = VI(h
t)−S. Also, if the regulator inspected in period t−1,
it prefers to keep inspecting, since switching to wait gives it a continuation payoff of
at most δV¯W , while inspecting gives VI(h
t) = VW (h
t) +S > δV¯W +S > δV¯W . So, since
(independently of its previous action) the regulator has a strict incentive to inspect at
history ht, we have that β(ht) = 1, which contradicts the first part of the proof.
Finally, we show that β(ht) > β at all ht. Assume for a contradiction that
β(ht) ≤ β for some history ht, so α(ht) = 1. If the regulator did not inspect at time
t− 1, then its payoff from continuing to wait at date t is zero. If, instead, it switches
to inspect, it obtains −S − (1− δ)i+ y + δVI(ht, 1). Since the regulator can switch to
wait in period t+ 1, we have that VI(h
t, 1) ≥ 0, so by Assumption 1 the regulator has
a strict incentive to switch to inspect. Conversely, if the regulator inspected in period
t−1, its payoff from continuing to inspect is at least −(1−δ)i+y, which is higher than
the payoff obtained by switching to wait, which is zero. This implies a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 1. Fix, for this proof, an equilibrium, assuming it exists.
We will determine its properties and finally establish its existence.
Recall that in the proof of Lemma 1 we show that VW (h
t) = 0 for all ht, so
VI(h
t) ∈ [0, S] for all ht. In particular, if there was a conviction at time t− 1, since the
regulator has to be weakly willing to switch to wait, we have that VI(h
t) = 0. We use
this observation to prove the following.
Lemma 2 For all histories ht, α(ht) ≤ α∗ ≡ (1−δ)(i+S)
y−δS . Also, the regulator is willing
to switch to inspect at history ht if and only if α(ht, 0s) = α∗ for all s ≥ 0.
Proof. We begin by proving the second part of the claim. Fix a history ht and
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assume that the regulator is willing to switch to inspect at time t, so VI(h
t) = S. Then
S = VI(h
t) = −(1− δ)i+ α(ht)(y − δ0)+ (1− α(ht))δVI(ht, 0).
Since, by Lemma 1 we have VI(h
t, 0) ≤ S, the above expression implies that α(ht) ≥ α∗,
or, alternatively, β(ht) ≤ α−1(α∗) (recall that α(·) is defined in equation (1)). Assume
that VI(h
t, 0) < S, and let t+τ (with τ ≥ 1) be the first time after t such that, if there is
no conviction from t to t+τ , the regulator switches to inspect with positive probability
at time t+ τ + 1 (note that it exists since, otherwise, the absence of convictions would
drive β(ht, 0τ ) below β, for some τ ∈ N, which would contradict Lemma 1). Then,
since between t + 1 and t + τ the regulator does not switch to inspect (if there is
no conviction), the lack of convictions makes firms increasingly convinced that the
regulator is not inspecting, so the perceived probability of inspection decreases over
time and α(ht) < α(ht, 0τ ). Nevertheless, we have that
VI(h
t, 0τ ) = −(1− δ)i+ α(ht, 0τ )(y − δ0)+ (1− α(ht, 0τ ))δS.
Hence, VI(h
t, 0τ ) > S, contradicting Lemma 1, so necessarily VI(h
t, 0) = S and α(ht) =
α∗. The same argument above implies α(ht, 0) = α∗, and the argument can be used
iteratively to prove that α(ht, 0τ ) = α∗ for all τ ≥ 0. The converse implication (i.e.,
that if α(ht, 0τ ) = α∗ for all τ ≥ 0, then the regulator is willing to switch to inspect at
history ht) follows straightforwardly by calculating that VI(h
t) = S and recalling that
VW (h
t) = 0 in any equilibrium.
Now consider the first part of the claim. For the sake of contradiction, assume
that there exists a history ht such that α(ht) > α∗. By the previous part of the proof,
the regulator is strictly willing to keep waiting at time t. Let t+ τ + 1 > t be the first
time where the regulator is willing to switch to inspect (which exists by the argument
above). Notice that α(ht, 0s) > α(ht, 0s−1) for all s = t+ 1, ..., t+ τ , so α(ht, 0τ ) > α∗.
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Therefore,
VI(h
t, 0τ ) = −(1− δ)i+ α(ht, 0τ )(y − δ0)+ (1− α(ht, 0τ ))δS
> −(1− δ)i+ α∗(y − δ0)+ (1− α∗)δS = S.
Hence there is a strict incentive to switch to inspect, contradicting Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 establishes that, in any equilibrium, if the regulator is willing to switch to
inspect at a history ht, then the offense probability equals α∗ until there is a conviction.
This result indicates that all equilibria feature “stationary phases”: after any history
where the regulator is willing to switch its action to inspect, the offense rate is constant
(and equal to α∗) until there is a conviction.
We now turn our focus to equilibrium behavior outside stationary phases. To do
this, for each βˆ0 ∈ (α−1 (α∗) , β¯) define the following sequence for t ≥ 0:
βˆt+1(βˆ0) =
(
1− α(βˆt(βˆ0))
)
βˆt(βˆ0)(
1− α(βˆt(βˆ0))
)
βˆt(βˆ0) + 1− βˆt(βˆ0)
(6)
(where βˆ0(βˆ0) is defined to equal βˆ0). This is a decreasing sequence that reproduces
the evolution of beliefs βt when there are no convictions and the regulator does not
change its action. In particular, we interpret βˆ0 as a guess for the perceived probability
of inspection in the period immediately after a conviction, and our goal will be to find
one that satisfies all equilibrium conditions. Notice that, since βˆ0 < β¯, then there
exists some T (βˆ0) such that βˆT (βˆ0)−1(βˆ0) > α
−1(α∗) ≥ βˆT (βˆ0)(βˆ0). The value T (βˆ0)
is interpreted as the length of the deterrence phase; that is, the time it takes for the
regulator to be willing to switch to inspect and, as a result, by Lemma 2, the stationary
phase to begin. The value α−1(α∗) will be the lowest level of the perceived probability
of inspection βmin in the proposition.
For a fixed βˆ0, define the sequence (VI,s(βˆ0))s from 0 to T (βˆ0) backwards by setting
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VI,T (βˆ0)(βˆ0) = S and, for all s = 0, ..., T (βˆ0)− 1,
VI,s(βˆ0) = −(1− δ)i+ α(βˆs(βˆ0))y + (1− α(βˆs(βˆ0)))δVI,s+1(βˆ0). (7)
Here, VI,s(βˆ0) is interpreted as the continuation value of the regulator in the period
s + 1 after a conviction, if it inspected in the period s after a conviction. We can
then see that there exists a unique βmax ∈ (β, β¯) such that VI,0(βmax) = 0; that is,
such that after a conviction the regulator is indifferent between switching to wait or
not (which, by Lemma 1, is required to be the case in equilibrium). This follows from
noticing that (i) as βˆ0 → β¯, we have T (βˆ0)→∞ and βˆt(βˆ0)→ β¯ for all t ≥ 0, so also
VI,0(βˆ0)→ −i, while (ii) as βˆ0 → α−1 (α∗), VI,0(βˆ0)→ S, and (iii) the following lemma
holds.
Lemma 3 VI,0(·) is continuous and strictly decreasing on (α−1(α∗), β¯).
Proof. We can rewrite Equation (6) as follows:
βˆt+1(βˆ0)
1− βˆt+1(βˆ0)
=
βˆt(βˆ0)
1− βˆt(βˆ0)
(
1− α(βˆt(βˆ0))
)
.
Since α(·) is strictly decreasing, the right-hand side is an increasing function of βˆt(βˆ0).
It is then easy to see that T (·) is both left-continuous and increasing.
We now show that VI,0(·) is continuous. It is clear that, if T (·) is continuous (and
therefore locally constant) at βˆ0, then VI,0(·) is continuous at βˆ0, since βˆt(βˆ0) and
α(βˆt(βˆ0)) are continuous in βˆ0 for all t = 0, 1, . . . , T
(
βˆ0
)
− 1. Assume then that βˆ0 is
such that T (·) is not continuous at βˆ0, so T (βˆ0) + 1 = limβ↘βˆ0 T (β). This implies that
βˆT (βˆ0)
(
βˆ0
)
= α−1(α∗), and that limβ↘βˆ0 βT (βˆ0)(β) = α
−1(α∗). So, we have that
VI,T (βˆ0)(β) = −(1− δ)i+ α(βˆT (βˆ0)(β))y + (1− α(βˆT (βˆ0)(β)))δS →β↘βˆ0 S,
where we use that
α(βˆT (βˆ0)(β))→β↘βˆ0 α∗.
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As a result, VI,0(·) is continuous at βˆ0.
Finally, that VI,0(·) is strictly decreasing follows because, if T (·) is continuous
(and locally constant) at βˆ0, then VI,0(βˆ0) is locally strictly decreasing in βˆ0, given
that α(βˆt(βˆ0)) is decreasing in βˆ0 for all t = 0, 1, . . . , T
(
βˆ0
)
− 1. That VI,0(·) is
strictly decreasing on all of (α−1 (α∗) , β¯) then follows from continuity of VI,0(·) as just
established.
Lemma 3 and the previous results establish that there is an equilibrium like the
one described in the statement of Proposition 1. The reason that all equilibria admit
the same characterization is the following. Lemma 2 establishes that stationary phases
feature the same per-period offense probability in all equilibria. Also, provided the
regulator is not willing to switch from wait to inspect at a given public history, the
perceived probability of inspection falls in the absence of a conviction in the previous
period. This means that, following a conviction, the perceived probability of inspection
declines over time (provided there is no further conviction) until a period in which a
waiting regulator is willing to start inspecting, i.e. until play enters the stationary
phase. This ensures also that the expected payoff for the regulator being in the “in-
spect” state strictly increases as time passes since a conviction, until the stationary
phase begins, which in turn implies that the regulator only switches from inspect to
wait in the period immediately following a conviction. This ensures that, indeed, the
perceived probability of inspection evolves according to the Bayesian updating formula
in Equation (6) in any equilibrium.
Proof of Corollary 1. Proven in the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Corollary 2. For each fixed βˆ0 ∈ (βmin, β), let T (βˆ0, S) be defined as in
the proof of Proposition 1, now making explicit its dependence on S through the fact
that α−1(α∗) is a decreasing function of S (since α−1(·) is decreasing and α∗ given in
(4) is increasing in S). Consider first the generic case where T (·, S) is continuous (and
therefore locally constant) at βˆ0. Then, a small change in S does not change T (βˆ0, S)
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(since α−1(α∗) is continuous in S), and so
∂VI,0(βˆ0, S)
∂S
> 0 ,
where VI,0(βˆ0, S) corresponds to VI,0(βˆ0) in the proof of to Proposition 1, again making
explicit its dependence on S. As a result, if the equilibrium perceived probability
of inspection after a conviction is βˆ0, a small increase in S requires that βˆ0 slightly
increase, maintaining VI,0(βˆ0, S) = 0, and therefore the length of the deterrence phase
does not change.
Now assume that T (βˆ0, S) is not continuous at βˆ0, so T (βˆ0, S)+1 = limβ↘βˆ0 T (β, S)
and βˆT (βˆ0,S) = β
min. In this case, holding βˆ0 fixed, a small increase in S increases α
∗
and so decreases α−1(α∗), and therefore limS′↘S T (βˆ0, S ′) = T (βˆ0, S) + 1. As a result,
if ε > 0 is small enough
VI,0(βˆ0, S+ε) = VI,0(βˆ0, S)
−δT (βˆ0,S)S+δT (βˆ0,S)(−(1−δ)i+ α∗y + (1−α∗)δ(S+ε))
= VI,0(βˆ0, S) + δ
T (βˆ0,S)+1ε .
This implies, again, if the equilibrium perceived probability of inspection after a con-
viction is βˆ0, a small increase in S necessitates a slight increase in βˆ0, in order that
VI,0(βˆ0, S) = 0. Hence, the length of the deterrence phase increases by one.
Proof of Corollary 3. Let T (δ) denote the equilibrium length of the deterrence
phase (now making the dependence of T on δ explicit). Let A(δ) be the probability
of an offense in the T (δ) periods since a conviction.
Lemma 4 As δ → 1, (1− δ)T (δ)→ log(1 + S/i) and A(δ)→ 0.
Proof. Using a similar notation as in the proof of Proposition 1, let βˆt denote the
equilibrium perceived probability of inspection t + 1 periods after a conviction. Note
that, as δ → 1 we have α∗ → 0 (by Equation (4)), and so βmin = α−1 (α∗)→ β¯. Since
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α∗ is the highest probability of an offense in any period, it is easily verified from Bayes’
rule that A(δ)→ 0 when δ → 1. Then, notice that
−
T (δ)−1∑
t=0
δt(1−δ)i+ δT (δ)S
≤0
≤−(1−δ)i+ A(δ)y+ (1−A(δ))δ
(
−
T (δ)−2∑
t=0
δt(1−δ)i+ δT (δ)−1S
)
.
The left-hand side of the first inequality is a lower bound on the regulator’s expected
payoff following a conviction. The inequality holds because the regulator prefers
obtaining a conviction over continuing to inspect. The right-hand side of the second
inequality is an upper bound on the regulator’s expected payoff following a conviction,
using that the regulator prefers convictions to occur earlier rather than later. When
δ → 1, the two bounds converge to zero. As a result, we have
lim
δ→1
(−(1− δT (δ))i+ δT (δ)S) = 0 ⇒ lim
δ→1
δT (δ) =
i
i+ S
.
This implies that limδ→1 T (δ) (1− δ) = log(1 + S/i).
Now, let us turn our focus to the stationary phase. Let T¯ (δ) be the expected time
until the first conviction during the stationary phase. The following result describes
its limiting behavior:
Lemma 5 As δ → 1, (1− δ)T¯ (δ)→ 1
β¯
y−S
i+S
.
Proof. The expected time until the first conviction is given by
T¯ (δ) =
∞∑
t=0
tα−1(α∗)α∗(1− α−1(α∗)α∗)t = 1− α
−1(α∗)α∗
α−1(α∗)α∗
.
Using the expression for α∗ in (4), limδ→1 α∗ = 0 and hence limδ→1 α−1(α∗) = β¯, and
we have that limδ→1(1− δ)T¯ (δ) = y−Sβ¯(i+S) .
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Let’s finally compute α¯ for δ close to one. To do this, notice (using Lemma 4) that
α¯ =
T¯ (δ)α∗
T¯ (δ) + T (δ)
+ o(1− δ)
=
1− δ
y−S
i+S
+ β¯ log(1 + S/i)
+ o(1− δ)
where o (1− δ) represents terms such that o (1− δ) / (1− δ) approaches zero as δ → 1.
The result then follows because the derivative of the first term with respect to S is
k(1− δ), where
k =
i
(
1− β¯)+ y − β¯S(
y − S + β¯ (i+ S) log (1 + S/i))2
is (after noting y > S by Assumption 1) a strictly positive constant independent of the
value δ.
Proof of Proposition 2. Fix an equilibrium, and let V (ht) denote the expected
discounted continuation payoff of the regulator at date t following public history ht
(note that V (ht) ≥ 0 at every history ht, since the inspector can choose to play “wait”
forever). The result follows from three lemmas that characterize such an equilibrium
and establish that it is unique. The first obtains that, like in our baseline model (see
the proof of Lemma 1), the continuation value of the regulator when it waited in the
previous period is equal to zero.
Lemma 6 For all ht such that bt−1(ht) = W , V (ht) = 0.
Proof. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that the statement of the lemma
does not hold. Fix an equilibrium and let V W = sup{ht|bt−1(ht)=W} V (h
t), and assume
V W > 0. Then, there is a history h
t with bt−1(ht) = W and such that V (ht) > δV W .
If the regulator weakly prefers to continue waiting at history ht then we have
δV W < V (h
t) = δV (ht, (W, 0)) ≤ δV W ,
a contradiction. This implies that the regulator switches to inspect (for sure) in period
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t. Let t′ > t be the first time where the regulator has the incentive to switch back to
wait. Then, we have
δV W < V (h
t) = −S − (1− δt′−t)i+ δt′−tV (ht′) < δV W ,
where we use that (a) there are no offenses from date t up to date t′ − 1, and (b) the
regulator’s continuation payoff if switching to wait at date t′ is no greater than δV W .
These inequalities again imply a contradiction.
The second lemma establishes that, if the regulator inspected in the previous pe-
riod, its current continuation value is zero. Notice that, in our baseline model, this was
only true when it was common knowledge that the regulator inspected the previous
period, that is, after a conviction.
Lemma 7 For all ht such that bt−1(ht) = I, V (ht) = 0.
Proof. Take a history ht such that bt−1(ht) = I and assume that V (ht) > 0. Let
t′ > t be the first time where the inspector is willing to switch to wait. We have
0 < V (ht) = −(1− δt′−t)i+ δt′−t0 < 0 ,
which is a contradiction.
Finally, the next lemma shows that the regulator is indifferent between choosing
W and I in each period. This is different from our baseline model where, during the
deterrence phase, the regulator has strict preferences in equilibrium (i.e., to continue
with the same action).
Lemma 8 At all histories ht, the regulator is indifferent between choosing W and I.
Proof. Take a history ht with bt−1(ht) = W . Choosing bt = W gives a continuation
payoff of 0. Alternatively, choosing bt = I gives
−S − (1− δ)i+ αt(ht)y + δ0 .
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By Lemma 6 this expression cannot be strictly positive. Assume, for the sake of contra-
diction, that the previous expression is strictly negative. In this case, the probability of
inspection following history ht, i.e. β(ht), is zero; therefore the probability of offending
following ht, i.e. α (ht), equals one. By Assumption 1 the previous expression is strictly
positive when α(ht) = 1, which leads to a contradiction.
Take a history ht with bt−1(ht) = I. Choosing bt = W gives a continuation payoff
of 0. Alternatively, choosing bt = I gives
− (1− δ)i+ αt(ht)y + δ0 . (8)
By Lemma 7, the expression (8) cannot be larger than 0. If it is less than 0, then
β(ht) = 0, and therefore α(ht) = 1, implying, by Assumption 1, that in fact (8) is
strictly positive, a contradiction.
The previous results together with arguments in the main text show the offense
probabilities are given according to the statement of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. In our base model, as δ approaches one, α∗ vanishes
(see Equation (4)), and hence α¯ vanishes as well. Nevertheless, α¯fd does not vanish
as δ approaches α∗. Indeed, notice that, as δ → 1, while αI → 0, we have that
αW → Sy ∈ (0, 1). As a result,
lim
δ→1
α¯fd =
1− β¯
1− β¯ + α−1(S
y
)
S
y
> 0 .
Therefore, if δ is high enough, α¯fd > α¯.
Proof of Proposition 4. We posit a continuation value V¯I for the regulator
following a conviction, and show that a value exists which coincides with an equilibrium
sharing the description of equilibrium in Proposition 1.
Let α∗ denote the probability of offending in the stationary phase of our putative
equilibrium, as in our base model. The regulator’s continuation value in the stationary
phase is −α
∗L
1−δ if it waited the previous period, since it is (weakly) willing to never
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switch to inspect. The indifference condition in the stationary phase imposes that, if
the regulator inspected the previous period, its continuation value is −α
∗L
1−δ + S. So, α
∗
solves the following equation
− α
∗L
1− δ + S = −(1− δ)i+ α
∗(−L+ y + δV¯I) + (1− α∗)δ
(
− α
∗L
1− δ + S
)
.
The solution is then given by
α∗(V¯I) =
(1− δ)(√(y − δS + δV¯I)2 + 4δL(i+ S)− y − δV¯I + δS)
2δL
.
It is easy to show (differentiating the previous expression) that α∗(V¯I) is decreasing in
V¯I , limV¯I→∞ α
∗(V¯I) = 1 and, moreover, α∗(V¯I) = 1 for V¯
†
I ≡ − L1−δ − y−(1−δ)i−Sδ . So, as
long as V¯I ≥ V¯ †I , α∗(V¯I) ∈ (0, 1].
We want to apply a similar argument as the one in the second part of Proposition
1, that is, obtain a perceived probability of inspection βˆ0 such that the regulator is
indifferent to switching to wait after a conviction. However, we cannot mimic the
argument because now α∗(V¯I) is not known before solving for V¯I (in our base model
α∗ is given by equation (4), and V¯I = 0).
We therefore fix V¯I ∈ [V¯ †I ,∞) and define, for each βˆ0 ∈ (α−1
(
α∗
(
V¯I
))
, β), the
updated probability βˆt(βˆ0) in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 1. Now, we
use T (βˆ0; V¯I) to denote the time satisfying
βˆT (βˆ0;V¯I)−1(βˆ0) > β(α
∗(V¯I)) ≥ βˆT (βˆ0;V¯I)(βˆ0) . (9)
We can now define (VI,t(βˆ0; V¯I))
T (βˆ0;V¯I)
t=0 analogously to the proof of Proposition 1 and,
additionally, we can now define the sequence (VW,t)
T (βˆ0;V¯I)
t=0 backward defining, for all
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t = 0, ..., T (βˆ0; V¯I),
VI,t(βˆ0; V¯I) = −(1−δ)i+ α(βˆt(βˆ0))(y − L+ δV¯I) + (1− α(βˆt(βˆ0)))δVI,t+1(βˆ0; V¯I)
with VI,T (βˆ0;V¯I) = −
α∗(V¯I)L
1−δ + S,
VW,t(βˆ0; V¯I) = −α(βˆt(βˆ0))L+ δVW,t+1(βˆ0; V¯I)
with VW,T (βˆ0;V¯I)(βˆ0; V¯I) = −
α∗(V¯I)L
1−δ .
Notice that
lim
βˆ0↗β¯
[
VI,0(βˆ0; V¯I)− VW,0(βˆ0; V¯I)
]
= −i < 0,
and
lim
βˆ0↘α−1(α∗(V¯I))
[
VI,0(βˆ0; V¯I)− VW,0(βˆ0; V¯I)
]
= S.
Hence, using the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1 (see Lemma 3), we
have that there exists some βmax(V¯I) such that VI,0(β
max(V¯I); V¯I) = VW,0(β
max(V¯I); V¯I).
It is then only left to show that there exists some V¯ ∗I ≥ V¯ †I such that VI,0(βmax(V¯ ∗I ); V¯ ∗I ) =
V¯ ∗I .
Assume first that Assumption 1 holds. Since limV¯I→∞ α
∗(V¯I) = 0 we have
lim
V¯I→∞
α−1
(
α∗
(
V¯I
))
= β¯.
Then, note that VW,t(βˆ0; V¯I), as defined above, approaches zero uniformly over βˆ0 ∈(
α−1
(
α∗
(
V¯I
))
, β
)
as V¯I → ∞. It is then immediate from the definition of βmax(V¯I)
that limV¯I→∞ VI,0(β
max(V¯I); V¯I) = 0. Note also that limV¯I↘V¯ †I VI,0(β
max(V¯I); V¯I) > V¯
†
I
since we have that, for each V¯I ,
VI,0(β
max(V¯I), V¯I) = VW,0(β
max(V¯I), V¯I) ≥ −L
1− δ ,
while by Assumption 1, V¯ †I < − L1−δ . Using arguments again analogous to those in
Lemma 3, one can then establish continuity of VI,0(β
max(V¯I), V¯I) in V¯I , and hence there
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exists some V¯ ∗I ∈ (V¯ †I ,∞) such that VI,0(βmax(V¯ ∗I ); V¯ ∗I ) = V¯ ∗I .
To prove the result when Assumption 1 does not hold, we take δ sufficiently large.
Notice that, as δ → 1, α∗ (V¯I) → 0 for all V¯I ∈ [V¯ †I ,∞). Then, irrespective of βˆ0 ∈(
α−1
(
α∗
(
V¯I
))
, β
)
, the probability of an offense occurring from t = 0 to t = T (βˆ0; V¯I)−
1, given that an offense occurs with probability α(βˆt(βˆ0)) for each t, approaches zero as
δ → 1; moreover, convergence is uniform over βˆ0 ∈
(
α−1
(
α∗
(
V¯I
))
, β
)
. The arguments
are the same as in the proof of Lemma 4.
As a consequence, for a given fixed value V¯I ∈ [V¯ †I ,∞), we have that, as δ → 1,
VI,0(β
max(V¯I); V¯I)=−(1−δT (δ;V¯I))i+ δT (δ;V¯I)
(
− α
∗(V¯I)L
1− δ + S
)
+ o(1), and (10)
VW,0(β
max(V¯I); V¯I)=δ
T (δ;V¯I)
(
− α
∗(V¯I)L
1− δ
)
+ o(1) ,
where, with some abuse of notation, T (δ; V¯I) is used to denote T (β
max(V¯I); V¯I), but now
making explicit the dependence on δ. Using our definition of βmax(V¯I), the difference
in these expressions is given by
0 = VI,0(β
max(V¯I); V¯I)− VW,0(βmax(V¯I); V¯I) = −(1−δT (δ;V¯I))i+ δT (δ;V¯I)S + o(1) .
As in the proof of Lemma 4, we find that, as δ → 1, δT (δ;V¯I) → i/(i + S). Hence, we
have (using (10) and the definition of α∗(VI)) that
VI,0(β
max(V¯I); V¯I) = h
(
V¯I
)
+ o (1)
where
h(V¯I) = − i
i+ S
√
(y − S + V¯I)2 + 4L(i+ S)− y − V¯I + S
2
Now note that, because L > 0, we have h(0) < 0. Also, because L > 0, we
have V¯ †I → −∞ as δ → 1. Then, note that limV¯I→−∞ h(V¯I)/VI = ii+S . The latter
implies that h(V¯ ′I ) − V¯ ′I > 0 for some V¯ ′I taken sufficiently small. In turn, for all δ
close enough to one, we find that VI,0(β
max(V¯ ′I ); V¯
′
I ) − V¯ ′I > 0 and V¯ ′I > V¯ †I while
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VI,0(β
max(0); 0) < 0. Hence, given that VI,0(β
max(V¯I); V¯I) is continuous in V¯I (for each
δ) a solution to VI,0(β
max(V¯I); V¯I) = V¯I exists for all δ close enough to one, with this
solution always greater than V¯ †I , proving our result. Out of interest, note that this
solution satisfies
V¯ ∗I = −
√
(y − S)2 + 4LS − y + S
2S/i
+ o(1) .
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